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‘You can’t do both – something will give’:  
Limitations of the targets culture in managing UK healthcare workforces 
Leo McCann, Edward Granter, John Hassard, Paula Hyde 
Abstract 
Based on a three-year ethnographic study of four UK National Health Service (NHS) 
organizations, we explore the everyday cultural experience of managing clinical and 
administrative workforces. Although NHS organizations claim to function as 
enlightened HRM employers, we argue that the inflexible application of metrics-
based target systems to clinical and administrative tasks, including HRM operations, 
can result in dysfunctional outcomes for patient care and workforce morale. 
Reminiscent of the recent Mid Staffordshire healthcare scandal, the priorities 
attached to NHS personnel meeting the demands of performance management 
systems can prove incompatible with them also meeting the fundamental ‘human’ 
needs of patients.  The everyday experience of healthcare organization becomes one 
of employees reconciling competing logics of business efficiency and integrity of 
care.  Trapped metaphorically between shrinking resources and expanding targets, 
the inclination - on the frontline and at mid-management level - is to extend the 
integrity of care, although this is sometimes impossible and can prove problematic in 
terms of system accountability. In response to such organizational tensions the 
behaviour of many frontline and mid-management staffs ultimately reflects a form of 
‘street-level bureaucracy’ - a situation in which traditional professional norms are re-
asserted informally in ways that often transgress prescribed performance systems.  
 
Keywords: Healthcare management; National Health Service; Performance targets; 
Professionalism; Street-level bureaucracy 
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Introduction  
 
Efforts to reform and improve the management of work and human resources in 
healthcare settings have increasingly turned to abstract and numerical forms of 
control.  Such forms include the promotion of ‘off-the-shelf’ management information 
systems, quality improvement techniques based on standardization, and ‘lean’ 
organizational philosophies (Adler et al, 2003; Gawande, 2010; Waring and Bishop, 
2010). In the UK National Health Service (NHS)1 such technical-numerical systems 
have often taken the form of rigid performance targets; for example, the eighteen-
week ‘pathway’ for outpatients, the four-hour waiting limits for Accident and 
Emergency (A&E) patients, and the eight-minute ambulance response time for 
(‘category A’) emergency calls (AUTHORS, 2013; Bevan and Hood, 2006; 
Wankhade, 2012). Targets are indeed becoming increasingly commonplace in HRM 
systems, with ‘hard’ HR policies in NHS organizations (or Trusts) stipulating 
objectives for capacity utilization, roster completion, staff development, and sickness 
absence.  Performance targets for patient care (e.g. waiting lists, response times) 
and HR management (e.g. sickness absence, staff development) alike carry 
penalties for their breach, hence the phrase ‘targets and terror’ (Bevan and Hood, 
2006).  
 
Many of the above performance metrics are derived from concepts of systems 
analysis and ‘management by objectives’ originally developed by the RAND 
Corporation and the US Department of Defense in the 1950s and 60s (Hoos, 1972; 
Talbot, 2010).  Such approaches purport to place objective ‘metrics’ at the heart of 
the everyday management of organizations.  Targets, metrics, and management by 
objectives are supposedly ‘rational’ and ‘systematic’ approaches to measuring and 
controlling aspects of organizational behaviour.  The aim is to ensure efficiency, 
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enhance productivity and ‘effectiveness’, increase levels of staff accountability, and 
avoid errors and failures.  
 
In practice, however, such systems have long been unpopular with professionals in 
any number of sectors and settings.  Professionals often regard these managerial 
impositions as a form of de-professionalization that drives out personal discretion and 
weakens occupational control over the delivery of work (Byrne, 1993; Dent, 2008; 
Hoos, 1972; Wankhade, 2012). Such abstract systems frequently alienate 
professionals, who are often considered ‘difficult to manage’.  Medically-trained 
professionals often resent administrators and managers who have little or no direct 
knowledge of professional practice, and who they consider under-qualified in 
comparison to their own occupational groups.  This is notably the case in healthcare 
settings (de Bruijn, 2011; Theodosius, 2008) where even if managerial staff have 
prior clinical experience they can be criticised as ‘remote’ from, or having ‘lost touch 
with’, the ‘real work’ of treating patients (Metz, 1981; Tangherlini, 1998). 
 
Conceptually, abstract management systems, and especially performance metrics, 
have received significant criticism from a number of quarters.  Writers regularly point 
to their capacity for ‘goal displacement’, whereby the political act of showing that 
targets have been met assumes greater importance than the practical completion of 
the work itself (de Bruijn, 2007: 17-19; see also Hood, 2006).  It is argued, further, 
that both the definition and quantitative measurement of ‘effectiveness’ are factors 
that habitually remain opaque (Talbot, 2010: 144-7). Some have argued that the  
excessive adoption and rigid application of target-based systems can actually foster 
dramatic organizational failures (Ordonez et al, 2009). As we shall see below, from 
the perspective of NHS junior and middle managers, many chronic problems with 
performance targets have surfaced in healthcare management recently.  In the eyes 
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of many frontline and mid-level healthcare employees these systems are part of the 
problem rather than the solution to complex organizational challenges. 
 
This is not to say, however, that the use of numerical targets is wrong in all 
circumstances. Commentators have described the effectiveness of numerical-
technical control measures in a range of economic sectors. Heavily standardised and 
metrics-driven systems - such as Lean Production, Six Sigma, or Total Quality 
Management, for example - can function effectively in automobile manufacture or 
back-office processing, when work is typically performed on inanimate objects or 
digital information.  But such systems may be inappropriate for the management of 
healthcare tasks, which often require complex interventions and diagnoses, 
unexpected surges in demand, and a general capacity for human care and 
compassion (Theodesius, 2008; Waring and Bishop, 2010).  Nevertheless, 
successive UK governments have pressed for the adoption of metrics-based 
performance systems throughout the NHS (and in public administration more 
generally, such as policing and probation, schools, tax collection, and local 
government) as they attempt to rein in costs and increase control over professional 
work (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Greiling, 2006; Hupe and Hill 2007). 
 
Recent events, however, may be leading to a rethink of the ‘targets culture’. In March 
2009 the UK Healthcare Commission’s ‘Investigation into Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust’ indicated that a prioritization by managers of performance 
indicators had jeopardised patient safety and care (Commission for Healthcare Audit 
and Inspection, 2009). The Mid Staffordshire Trust was the overall management 
structure responsible for a number of NHS care providers, including Stafford 
Hospital, where due to substandard care perhaps as many as 400-1200 more 
patients died between 2005 and 2008 than would be expected for the type of 
hospital.2 In effect, at the heart of the Mid Staffordshire scandal was the mechanism 
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whereby organizational and administrative imperatives were prioritized over patient 
care; a clear case of ‘goals gone wild’ (Ordonez et al, 2009).   
 
Revelations of abuse and neglect at Stafford Hospital were considered shocking by 
all sections of the UK press.  Widely reported, for example, were stories of patients 
being left in their own excrement and urine by nurses and ancillary ward staff, 
patients being given insufficient water and nutrition (Francis 2013: 19), and a 
tendency for hospital staff at many levels to conceal, rather than address, failures 
and concerns (Francis 2013: 184).3 The 2010 independent investigation 
recommended that the regulator, Monitor, de-authorise Mid Staffordshire Trust’s 
‘Foundation’ status and in June 2010 the new (Conservative-Liberal Democrat) 
coalition government announced that a full public inquiry would report on the 
scandal.  The final report - The Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public 
Inquiry, chaired by Robert Francis QC - was published on 6 February 2013, making 
290 recommendations, many of which suggested enforcing a new duty of openness, 
transparency and candour amongst NHS staff, and arguing that increasing 'micro-
regulation' may produce serious unintended consequences. The ‘Mid Staffs’ affair 
has deeply shaken public and political faith in the effectiveness of NHS provision, 
with a ‘targets culture’ often featuring as one of the major reasons behind the failings 
(Taylor, 2013). 
 
With this background in mind, this paper explores the views of NHS junior and middle 
management staff about the effects of numerical targets on the management of 
healthcare organizations, and increasingly on the management of NHS human 
resources. It is now widely accepted that junior and mid-level line managers (in the 
case of healthcare usually nurse managers, ward managers, or clinical team leaders) 
play critical yet often unsung roles in what are usually large organizations (Hassard 
et al, 2009; Osterman, 2008), especially as intermediaries involved in the translation 
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and filtering of HR practices (Currie and Proctor, 2005; Hutchinson and Purcell, 2010; 
Purcell and Hutchinson, 2007; Townsend et al 2012). Our research, however, reports 
disturbing implications as to the ground-level reality of HR management and the 
everyday working culture of healthcare organizations. Widespread dissatisfaction 
with the targets culture was reported by line managers across the four Trusts studied, 
suggesting multiple problems as regards organizational performance, workforce 
morale and more importantly patient care.  
 
Based on this research we argue that target-based management regimes can 
promote a divisive situation in which healthcare staff are torn between two competing 
demands: the first we call ‘business efficiency’, and the other ‘integrity of care’. These 
are often impossible to reconcile, leading to problems with service management and 
delivery. With regards to targets, it became clear that there were profound difficulties 
in reconciling competing priorities across and between NHS Trusts, in what was 
essentially a wider regional healthcare economy. Interview and observational data 
revealed that mid-level managers in the NHS (many of whom have dual roles as both 
managers as clinicians), rather than being strictly ‘controlled’ by targets and metrics, 
in reality operated as ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Hudson, 1989; Hupe and Hill, 2007; 
Lipsky, 1980; Walker and Gilson, 2004).  They adopt this stance as they are forced to 
find informal ways of navigating this complex healthcare terrain, often by making 
decisions that ‘work around’ the formal targets regime. 
 
From our analysis, then, we advocate a move away from dysfunctional ‘targets 
cultures’ and suggest instead that a return to professional norms and clinical 
discretion form the basis for the management of healthcare work and healthcare 
workforces. We appreciate, however, that such a return to professional discretion 
almost completely undermines the approach of targets-driven ‘hard’ HRM. This 
means that such a turn is unlikely, especially as numbers-based systems will remain 
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attractive to governments struggling to contain healthcare costs, attempting to hold 
professionals accountable, and attempting to standardize practices to make them 
more easily transferrable from publicly-run healthcare providers to commercial and 
independent contractors. NHS Trusts are keen to maintain organizational control 
through performance targets because they promise (at least ‘on paper’) to be 
‘rational’ and ‘objective’ means of control (Taylor, 2013: 215). Yet these promises, 
like those in many other historical cases of organizational change in public service, 
are all-too-often found to be illusory and dysfunctional (Hoos, 1972). 
 
This paper proceeds in four further sections.  First we examine the origins of 
performance management and target-setting in healthcare and briefly discuss how 
the notion of ‘street-level bureaucracy’ (Lipsky, 1980) frames our analysis.  Second 
we explain the qualitative methods employed in our research into performance 
management systems in UK healthcare.  Third we present findings from our 
ethnographic investigations of the use of performance targets to control and manage 
healthcare work and workforces across our four NHS healthcare Trusts.  And finally 
we interpret the results from our case findings, ultimately suggesting that 
performance targets are a deeply flawed method of attempting to control and 
structure healthcare work, one that should be radically scaled back if healthcare 
providers are to adopt a ‘high-road’ HRM model that genuinely serves to improve the 
well-being of both patients and staff. 
 
Context: Performance management and targets in the NHS 
 
Target-setting in the UK NHS is today primarily realised through the use of 
Performance Indicators. Performance Indicators (PIs) were introduced in earnest to 
the NHS by the Conservative Party in 1983, although their conceptual heritage goes 
back to the 1950s and 60s, and even earlier to the development of the post-World 
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War 2 ‘organizational effectiveness’ paradigm (Talbot, 2010). In the management 
literature of the 1950s and 60s, the function of targets, objectives, and metrics (e.g. 
Management by Objectives) was to provide a sharper focus on results and 
outcomes, and greater coordination of the goals of workers with those set by the 
organization. It attempted to cut through the ambiguity of occupational and 
professional norms, and provide clarity, focus, and ‘objective’ measurement. The 
1990s development of the Balanced Score Card approach built on these ideas, 
attempting also to increase the number of items being measured into a so-called 
‘balanced’ analysis; one that would not, supposedly, prioritize financial results over 
other goals (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Since targets-based management 
presupposes, ipso facto, a greater emphasis on and capacity for monitoring 
performance (in terms of inputs and outputs) in theory it also facilitates and expedites 
more effective administrative control over the use of resources. This includes control 
over human resources, an important development when organizational behaviour in 
healthcare settings has traditionally been governed by professional and occupational, 
rather than managerial, norms. 
 
As a technology for controlling healthcare professionals, PIs can clearly play a 
powerful role in limiting their use of expensive treatments, especially given the recent 
stress on ‘austerity measures’ (AUTHORS, 2013). Indeed at the summit of the UK’s 
publicly funded healthcare system, the Department of Health has set ‘a target of 
achieving savings of £20bn on a budget of around £100bn by 2015’ (Taylor, 2013: 
82). In the US, targets are widely ascribed by Healthcare Maintenance Organizations 
(HMOs) to control professionals and ration their prescription of expensive treatments 
under the model of ‘managed care’ (Mechanic, 1999; Scheid, 2004: 63-4; Scott et al, 
2000). Similarly in the UK NHS, ‘the introduction of PIs was specifically linked to 
efficient resource use’ (OECD, 1993: 78); that is, to control spiralling medical costs.4 
As we argue below, this logic is increasingly being applied to the management of 
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NHS care workforces, but with highly problematic results.  HR managers try to 
increase efficiency and control costs by setting targets (and related penalties for non-
compliance) for capacity utilization, staff training, and sickness absence, yet all the 
while seeing these targets become harder to meet due to resource constraints.  
 
For the ‘New’ Labour government elected in Britain in 1997, the use of such a 
‘management by objectives’ philosophy fitted with the spirit of New Public 
Management; a range of emerging social policy ideas which generally sought to 
combine the dynamism and customer orientation of the market with the service ethic 
traditionally inherent in the public sector (Hood, 1991).  The emphasis on efficiency 
and control of resource use was in tune with the policy goals of a new government 
which sought to ‘shake up’ what were seen as sclerotic and bureaucratically-bloated 
public services - organizations in which questionable service provision was obscured 
behind the screen of professional norms. Thus, by 2004: ‘10 top-level targets 
applying to the Health Department in England were translated into some 300 lower-
level targets for the various public sector health-delivery organizations for which that 
department was responsible’ (Hood and Bevan, 2006: 515). Townley (2003: 1046) 
offered a succinct summary of the situation when suggesting:  
 
‘Performance measures are one means of achieving a managerialist 
rationality that includes reducing the size of the public sector, cutting 
government expenditures, bringing free-market principles and disciplines into 
government, developing a more customer oriented focus, and allowing public 
sector managers to be more autonomous and entrepreneurial.’   
 
But have targets, systems, and metrics actually achieved their stated aims? Do 
targets in healthcare actually work to control costs, improve ‘effectiveness’, raise 
standards, and establish accountability? A major problem is that targets, at least on 
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some level, have to be ‘reasonable’.  In other words, resources must be adequate in 
order for workforces to have any chance of meeting them. Many NHS Trusts have 
targets set for them (and also set their own) that appear unrealistic in the light of 
funding for NHS Trusts steadily contracting. In such times of tough accountability, 
healthcare organizations have to make difficult decisions about which functions they 
can devote their limited resources to. In some cases decisions will be made to favour 
‘integrity of care’. In others the demands of ‘business efficiency’ will win out. This 
scenario sees healthcare staff at a number of levels constantly juggling demands that 
should, in theory, be reconcilable, but which in practice are often not. As we shall 
see, in such dilemmas, the informal norms of discretionary ‘street-level bureaucracy’ 
come to inform the decisions of junior and middle-level NHS managers. Despite their 
strong influence, performance management systems can never fully ‘manage out’ 
these kinds of professional behaviour, based as they are on implicit and intangible 
values, years of experience of services and users, and the simple need for staff 
simply to ‘do what they can’ in demanding environments (Ellis et al 1999; Evans and 
Harris, 2004; Hudson, 1988; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003; Lipsky, 1980; 
Satyamurti, 1981; Walker and Gilson, 2004). 
 
The resource and operational pressures facing NHS Trusts are severe. Accident and 
Emergency doctors, for example, have recently warned of further patient safety 
scandals if levels of staffing and resources are to remain at seemingly inadequate 
levels, amid rapid increases in patients presenting to A&E5. Occupational 
associations such as the Royal College of Nurses or the Royal College of Midwives 
regularly complain - along with patient advocacy groups - that there are insufficient 
numbers of skilled frontline clinical staff available on hospital wards and that patient 
safety is threatened by understaffing and overstretched human resources.6 
Ambulance Trusts have admitted missing performance targets due to resource 
shortages and growing demand,7 with paramedics anonymously claiming that delays 
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are ‘causing harm and deaths’, partly because management’s pursuit of time targets 
has meant widespread reliance on solo-crewed response cars rather than dual-
crewed ambulances. Rapid response vehicles can arrive at a scene quickly to ‘stop 
the clock’, but patients and solo paramedics then often face long and potentially 
dangerous waits for dual-crewed ambulances to arrive to provide onward transport.8 
The A&E doctors’ warning of May 2013 used the language of ‘toxic overcrowding’ 
and ‘institutional exhaustion’ to describe the severity of the situation, while another 
similar report suggested that emergency departments are ‘on a cliff edge’, with 
workloads becoming ‘simply impossible’ to manage9. 
 
In such a problematic context for the NHS, the failings at Mid Staffordshire sit ‘at the 
extreme end of a spectrum which shades gradually from excellent, to tolerable, to 
awful.’ (Taylor, 2013: 187) The kinds of goal displacement inscribed in the attitude of 
‘what’s measured is what matters’ (Bevan and Hood, 2006) remains pervasive within 
the NHS.10 Other failings, distortions, and forms of ‘gaming’, which create perverse 
outcomes and typically result in a decline in morale for public service professionals, 
are noted in other public sector settings, including policing and probation, school 
teaching, tax collection, and social care (Carter et al, 2013; Ellis et al 1999; Hoos, 
1972; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2005; Moskos, 2009; Rudes 2012). All four of 
our case study NHS Trusts show similar failings or near-failings, confirming the 
recent media evidence of overworked and demoralized staff working in dangerously 
overstretched organizations.  
 
Our research, therefore, highlights the considerable distance between employee 
experience of work and NHS Trusts’ official policies of high-road HRM. In order for 
healthcare organizations to provide the best standards of care for patients, it is 
accepted that healthcare organizations should attempt to provide the best possible 
working conditions for staff (Hyde et al, 2009; Stanton et al, 2010; Townsend et al, 
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2011; West et al, 2006). This notion is clearly embodied in the NHS Constitution of 
2009, which formally provides four ‘pledges’ relating to the kind of working 
environment that staff can expect to find in all NHS organizations, an environment 
conducive both to staff development and well-being and to patient safety and care 
quality.11 But contrary to these HRM goals (or at least HRM ‘signals’; see Townsend 
et al, 2012), our data suggest that the morale of care staff was almost universally 
poor across the case organizations studied, not least because staff were 
exasperated with trying to square the circle of business efficiency versus integrity of 
care, especially in a context of ever-shrinking resources and ever-growing patient 
numbers. Trust in senior management was low, work intensity was high, work-life 
balance was poor, and staff generally did not feel valued by management.  
 
Our qualitative data, moreover, suggest that HR systems were unable to provide 
meaningful staff development, and employees were concerned by the invasion of a 
targets culture into HRM itself. This mirrors some of the quantitative findings from the 
NHS’s own 2012 staff survey, which were also discouraging in this respect. Just 36% 
of respondents agreed that their staff appraisals were ‘well structured’ and well under 
half (40%) felt that their organization took staff appraisal seriously; this number fell to 
just 23% for respondents employed in Ambulance Trusts (Department of Health, 
2013: 2). Across ‘NHS England’ only 35% of survey respondents agreed that 
communication between management and staff was effective, with this figure again 
being lowest for Ambulance Trusts, at just 20% (Department of Health, 2013: 2).12 
Our case study data provides strong evidence from across the NHS of disquieting 
work climates, with potentially severe implications for staff well-being, patient care 
and patient safety. As our analysis shows, the ‘targets culture’ is a major conduit 
through which these problems flow and from which conflicts emerge, both within and 
between NHS Trusts.  
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So difficult is this situation that junior and mid-level healthcare managers - in keeping 
with experiences reported in other public sectors (Ellis et al 1999; Rudes 2012; 
Walker and Gilson 2004) - regularly act as street-level bureaucrats by enacting a 
range of informal coping mechanisms to handle their ‘otherwise overwhelming’ 
workloads (Ellis et al 1999: 262). The concept of street-level bureaucracy, as 
originally developed by Lipsky (1980) and colleagues (Prottas, 1979; Weatherley, 
1979) refers to the ways in which front-line and mid-level employees in public service 
actually experience their workloads, and especially the ‘dilemmas of the individual’ in 
attempting to provide adequate public service. The perspective places considerable 
emphasis on how excessive workloads, inadequate resources, complex demands 
and unclear rules lead those charged with delivering services often to take 
discretionary action which confounds the official, top-level policies of public service 
organizations. Management will typically try to find ways of making street-level 
bureaucrats more ‘accountable’, but these attempts at regulating, standardizing and 
controlling the behaviour and mindset of street-level bureaucracy are often 
problematic and dysfunctional (Hudson, 1989: 48-9; see also Lipsky, 1980; Prottas, 
1979; Weatherley, 1979).  As our study will show, these long-standing concerns 
remain highly relevant to healthcare employees. Junior and middle managers across 
our case organizations continued to confront Lipsky’s ‘dilemmas of public service’ as 
they tried to deal with the often clashing imperatives of business efficiency and 
integrity of care. These competing priorities were often manifested most sharply in 
the form of performance targets.  
 
Methodology: Researching the ‘targets culture’   
 
Before we explore our data in relation to the themes discussed above, we turn to a 
description of the methodology employed in carrying out the research.   Our research 
involved an examination of workplace culture and performance management in four 
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UK healthcare settings: an Acute Hospital Trust, an Ambulance Trust, a Mental 
Health Trust, and a Primary Care Trust. In terms of fieldwork, this has seen the 
development of an ethnographic approach to investigation, one founded on two 
research techniques - interviewing and observation.   
 
Our interviews were based mainly on a semi-structured instrument directed at 
addressing issues related to performance management and target-setting. The 
interview process generally saw junior and middle managers interviewed at their 
place of work, and commonly in their offices, or else a private room if a manager 
worked in a shared office or open-plan setting.  The duration of interviews was 
generally between 60-90 minutes. The process of interviewing saw one or two 
members of the research team meet a single interviewee and record the discussion 
on a digital recorder. These recordings were transcribed subsequently by an external 
agency. On one or two occasions, however, interviewees were reluctant to have their 
views digitally recorded, and so the interviewer(s) took detailed notes by hand.  In 
total 80 interviews were conducted during the period of field investigations. 
 
In addition to semi-structured interviews, our fieldwork involved periods of 
observation, specifically non-participant observation. This research concerned, in the 
main, observations of employees at work, in team meetings, and in training sessions.  
Data were recorded mainly by hand-written notes, made either at the time of 
observation or in the period immediately afterwards. These notes represented the 
direct description of events, plus reflections and comments on particular issues and 
incidents. During the fieldwork, the team conducted 63 periods of non-participant 
observation. A period could represent, for example, anything from a one-hour staff 
meeting, to a training session lasting several hours, to a whole day spent 
‘shadowing’ a healthcare employee.   
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The process of analysis has largely been that of traditional ethnographic 
interpretation in organizational settings (Turner, 1972; Van Maanen, 2011; Watson, 
1994; Watson, 2011).  Rather than deploying a qualitative software package for the 
coding and classification of data, the research team generated its own grounded 
criteria relevant to the project.  It can be argued that this approach is more closely 
aligned with the interpretivist philosophical assumptions (ontological and 
epistemological) of ethnographic organizational enquiry. Our research has attempted 
to shed light on the grounded, everyday actions of junior and mid-level NHS 
managers as they make difficult decisions and wrestle with tight resources. It follows 
in the traditions of research on street-level bureaucracy in that it highlights the 
importance of various kinds of ‘pragmatic improvisation’ (Maynard Moody, 2003: 
165) carried out by public servants as they face up to the everyday realities of 
providing services while confronted by growing caseloads and the proliferation of 
targets-based systems. In the words of Hudson (1989: 53): 
 
‘academically, the pressing need is to find out more about how street-level 
bureaucrats are actually behaving. Getting at the truth would be problematic, 
but must be confronted. If we wish to understand policy implementation, we 
must understand the street-level bureaucrat.’  
 
Whilst somewhat reluctant to define our interviews and observations as representing 
the organizational ‘truth’, we nevertheless argue that our research answers a call to 
‘get inside’ public service workplaces in order to understand ‘how things work’ on an 
everyday basis (Watson, 2011). In our work, this is done to understand how 
organizations attempt to control healthcare workforces by using an array of 
supposedly rational targets and metrics. As we shall see, our interviews and 
observations record the complex and often morally difficult decisions of NHS 
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employees, as well as their subjective interpretations, as they attempt to account for 
their everyday actions. 
 
We now, then, turn to discussion of the ethnographic interview and observation data 
we gathered. We start by exploring the ways in which the targets culture had grown 
to structure organizational behaviour generally.  We then move on to demonstrate 
how this culture ‘crept’ into specific HR structures and the incentivizing of middle 
managers themselves. Throughout the three years of case research performance 
metrics were applied in the form of rationing resources and punishing ‘breaches’ of 
targets. Narrow, and often questionable, conceptions of business utility appeared to 
be championed by senior management at the expense of professional norms and the 
‘human’ needs of patients. Moreover, the spread of the targets culture into areas of 
people management appeared to undermine and restrict the development of 
professional and strategic forms of HRM.  This was a situation that ultimately proved 
dysfunctional when contrasted with the stated goals of these organizations; that is, of 
becoming effective and patient-focused healthcare providers with progressive 
employment practices (Aiken et al, 2001; Leggat et al, 2010; Townsend et al, 2011). 
 
Analysis: Working with ‘very bizarre’ targets 
 
Our analysis explores a number of broad and overlapping themes that emerged from 
the qualitative data collected during the period of research.  These themes include 
the gaming of targets, clashing incentives, and daily struggles around the provision of 
adequate levels of patient care. Such ‘street-level’ themes are embedded within what 
emerged as an often perverse targets culture within our focal organizations - one 
which was routinely criticised by many of the NHS junior and middle managers who 
had to work within it. 
 
17 
 
When issues of the setting and monitoring of targets were first raised by our NHS 
managers, the impression we formed was that such systems and techniques were 
being explained as objective and rational phenomena. However, it often did not take 
long before problematic issues began to surface. For example, initially an Estates 
Manager at the Acute Hospital site appeared to suggest that performance targets 
had been adopted as a logical way to organize and manage essential maintenance 
work: 
 
What we do is we classify work in terms of ‘immediate’, ‘urgent’ 
or ‘routine’.  Anything that is ‘immediate’ has a target of a 
response within three quarters of an hour and completion within 
two hours.  If it’s ‘urgent’ it has a response within four hours and 
completion within eight, and if it’s ‘routine’ it has a response 
within three days and completion within five.  Those are the 
targets, and then what we set ourselves is to meet those 
responses in 85% of the cases for the ‘routine’, 90% for the 
‘urgent’ and 95% on the ‘immediate’. (Deputy Head of Estates, 
Acute Hospital Trust) 
 
So far, this seems sensible and reasonable. But as the narrative continues the 
essence of the approach, as with other targets-based systems, appears to be 
premised on questionable assumptions. Even in its own terms - as providing 
objectives for rationing resources and creating business efficiency - the system did 
not seem to be exclusively ‘functional’. One interviewee at the Acute Hospital Trust 
offered a telling phrase - ‘it wasn’t based on any market analysis, but I had to make it 
work’: 
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Sometimes the execs have a habit of just drawing up plans, then 
we have to deliver the plans, then the plans become my problem 
if they don’t get delivered ... I was told we were doing a 15 bed 
unit and I had an income target of it being full for 90%. It wasn’t 
based on any market analysis but I had to make it work. That 
happens quite a lot. If it didn’t work it would totally become my 
problem and I would be performance managed and judged by 
that ... They say ‘well let’s put in that, we’ll do four new units and 
make a million or two, and we’ll worry about it later’ ... But what 
happens is, we don’t worry about it later. It becomes my 
problem. (Service Director, Acute Hospital Trust) 
 
The ‘quick reference’ component of the performance system meant that staff were 
able to prioritise a maintenance job by rating it a high risk (scoring 15+ out of 25).  
This would see a job go straight to the task board for action. But in a classic case of 
street-level bureaucracy there was a suspicion that junior and mid-level staff used the 
numerical system to ‘over-rate’ risks in order to bring their jobs to the top of the list. 
Estates managers were thus engaged in trying to assess the ‘real’ level of risk and 
negotiate these ratings down: 
 
You sometimes wonder ... is this really a 16 ... have they given it 
that just to make sure that it goes in front of the board, and then 
it’ll get some attention, it’ll get some resource? (Head of Estates, 
Acute Hospital Trust) 
 
In the Ambulance Trust, a senior HR manager explained in detail the range of 
competing targets his organization had to face. Resource constraints meant that 
choices had to be made about which goals the organization simply had to hit, and 
19 
 
others which could be allowed to slide. On the one hand government regulators 
(such as the Healthcare Commission’s successor, the Care Quality Commission) put 
pressure on the Trust to upgrade and expand its clinical training for paramedics, with 
the long-term goal of more patients being treated at the scene or at home by 
paramedics rather than being transported to overstretched A&E departments.  But, 
on the other hand, rolling-out enhanced training of its workforce would mean taking 
clinical staff ‘off the road’ for days at a time and therefore making it harder for the 
Trust to hit the much more urgent and immediate 8-minute response times for 
arriving at ‘Category A’ emergency scenes.  This was a typical case in which street-
level bureaucrats were confronted with ‘multiple demands for accountable behaviour’ 
(Hupe and Hill, 2007: 290). As an HR manager explains: 
 
If we are below target it is not easy to remedy it. We can’t poach 
staff from other NHS organizations. We train in-house [for 
several roles], and there is a minimum of four weeks, probably 
longer. There’s driver training also. Some of them fail the tests 
and have to retake. Ordering new ambulances takes time. You 
can’t just go and buy them, they are bespoke … We have a 
management development programme. We release staff and 
managers for this where we can. CQC criticized us for not being 
up to date on clinical training. But we can’t take people off the 
line easily. We’re damned if we do and damned if we don’t. 
(Senior HR Manager, Ambulance Trust) 
 
At a more junior level, an Ambulance Trust Sector Manager noted the prominence of 
financial imperatives, claiming that ‘if we don’t meet the care package, we don’t get 
paid. It’s becoming more ruthless if you like, more cut-throat.’ Given fundamental 
resource constraints, certain targets were clearly more important to hit than others, 
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even those officially defined as ‘mandatory’. To illuminate this further, we offer 
observation field notes from a Senior Management Team meeting at the Ambulance 
Trust; in which the issue of ‘what’s measured is what matters’ (Bevan and Hood, 
2006) surfaces explicitly in discussion: 
 
The meeting is taking place in a well-appointed room in the 
Ambulance Trust HQ. Large flip-chart pages are stuck on the 
walls, windows, or hung from the picture rail. There were around 
15-20 of these pages, covering a wide array of vital issues and 
tasks for discussion. The chair of the meeting [Senior Manager] 
quickly called the meeting to order and explained that this 
meeting is taking place during what has been a two-day session 
working on a new commissioning process, hence the paper over 
the walls. […] ‘These things needed to be sorted out very 
quickly, we’re under a lot of pressure’ he says […] A Senior HR 
manager starts to explain the ‘exceptionally challenging’ issues 
she has to report from a recent weekly meeting in which 
performance management KPIs were under discussion: 
 
 ‘Our targets on KSF13 and mandatory training is 90% through 
mandatory training by the end of March. This will go by the 
wayside. We’ve committed to 35%.’ 
Other middle managers (mostly heads of geographic sections) 
discuss this for some time, saying they cannot release staff from 
their teams easily for mandatory training or for KSF review. A 
consensus comes out that we should all ‘under-promise and 
over-deliver.’ 
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The chair of the meeting mentions that ‘What gets monitored 
gets done.’ 
[…]  
A middle manager warns that ‘We should not raise expectations 
too high. Taking a lot of people off the road for review is not 
sensible.’ (Observation field notes, Senior Management Team 
meeting, Ambulance Trust) 
 
Thus decisions and actions at local levels are characterized by a sense of enforced  
‘gaming’, in that the organization chooses which targets it believes are the most 
important for it to try to meet, based on an informal and experience-based 
‘rationalization’ of which have the heaviest penalties for being missed. Resources are 
so short that middle and senior managers are acutely aware that not all targets can 
be met. This encourages staff to ‘game’ the system by selecting targets they believe 
they can ‘get away with’ missing. Such forms of goal displacement and distortion 
were endemic in our organizations, not just at front-line levels, as per the classic 
formulation of Lipsky’s ‘street-level’ bureaucracy, but also across middle 
management, and notably in ways that are sometimes unofficially tolerated by more 
senior Trust management. 
 
Resource constraints, ever-present and worsening in the NHS due to austerity 
measures, had direct impact on the choice of which targets to prioritize. At the soon-
to-be-abolished Primary Care Trust, employees in both functional wings of the 
organization - commissioning and providing care - appeared to face increasingly 
heavy workloads (see also Hyde et al, 2009: 718-9).  What is more, they were now 
obliged to work with a numerical-technical ‘off the shelf’ management information 
system (known as Lorenzo) that many staff found problematic. Lorenzo’s functionality 
did not readily match with the kinds of tasks and processes that Allied Health 
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Professionals (AHP) (e.g. audiologists, podiatrists or occupational therapists 
contracted to or directly employed by the PCT) needed to complete. These care 
providers faced constant pressure from PCT senior management to quicken the pace 
and shorten the length of care episodes: essentially to spend less time and ‘resource’ 
with each patient, so that the work could be ‘logged’ and ideally ‘resolved’ through 
the Lorenzo system. Cynicism was a common reaction, such as below, where an 
embattled PCT middle manager/AHP suggests, with gentle sarcasm, that ‘points 
make prizes:’ 
 
It’s gruesome, honestly ... They set targets and every month you 
get how many patients you’ve seen in that month.  And that is 
online for you to reach your target at the end of the year, 
because it’s ‘points make prizes’.  So the PCT gets paid 
depending on activity. (Middle Manager/AHP, Primary Care 
Trust) 
 
In a segment of the interview that provides a powerful example of a Lipskian 
‘dilemma’ of public service, this manager went on to outline the nature of this problem 
in more depth; something she describes as ‘a quandary.’  That is, should a manager, 
as a matter of course, allow the targets to breach as a kind of warning mechanism?  
This is perhaps reminiscent of aspects of the Mid Staffordshire case, where the 
Francis report criticised staff for not speaking out about the length of the waiting lists 
and the prevalence of substandard care episodes. Perhaps if targets were allowed to 
be breached then managers would at least be alerted to the mounting workloads and 
tightening resources: 
 
You get in a quandary.  So, what do I do?  Do I really bust a gut 
and work every hour I can and keep on top of this 18 week 
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waiting list, which then actually doesn’t tell the powers that be 
over there that we’ve got a problem?  Well actually if we see 
those [patients] within the 18 week timeframe what do we do 
with them after that?  We haven’t got the staff to see them.  But 
which is best?  Do we see them and then know the problems 
we’ve got on a ‘waiting for’ [treatment] list; or do we not see them 
and let our waiting list grow?  And then they’ll complain over 
there at PCT HQ, and then we can say, ‘Yes but you’ve cut our 
staff’.  You know, ‘You’ve taken two full time equivalents out of 
my team in the last three months who’ve gone on maternity 
leave and aren’t being replaced.  So you’ve got to expect that my 
waiting list’s going to increase.’ But then you get more 
complaints …  You’re in a no-win situation really and that’s what 
I think we’re going to do at the moment is, you know, I’m going to 
see as many as I can see, but that waiting list is going to rise 
over 18 weeks. (Middle Manager/AHP, Primary Care Trust) 
 
At the PCT, senior managers and HR managers were described by junior and middle 
managers/clinicians as ‘remote’ and ‘detached’.  The perception often expressed was 
that they had no clear idea about the realities of frontline or mid-level work, especially 
when this work was focussed on the clinical needs of individuals. (Similar views are 
reported in Townsend et al’s (2012: 275) qualitative study of an Australian hospital.)  
In our case, many patients’ care needs were long-term and simply not amenable to 
being ‘resolved’ in a targets-based system. At times the pressures not to provide an 
adequate level of care seem to border on Mid Staffordshire style dysfunction: a 
Primary Care Trust that won’t deliver Primary Care: 
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We have annual targets that we have to meet and that in itself 
poses a massive problem because the person who sort of 
devises our quota for the year actually doesn’t know what we do.  
So they can say, ‘right well you know if you look at [a different 
clinical specialism], they can see I don’t know how many 
thousand people in a year’. And they say, ‘you know, the 
appointments are five, ten minutes each: in out, in out’.  [So the 
implication is] How come [my clinical staff] are only seeing six 
[patients] in a day? (Middle Manager/AHP, Primary Care Trust) 
 
Respondents remarked that monitoring problems could arise in situations in which 
there was a lack of appreciation or sensitivity on the part of some management 
functions - notably HR - to qualitative differences in the nature of (and demands 
placed upon) different clinical areas.  In what was a clear example of a public servant 
facing the ‘dilemmas of the individual’ - a classic feature of street-level bureaucracy 
(Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003) - one of our respondents 
provided enlightening views on this problem. Here, junior and middle-level healthcare 
employees are not so much working according to the imperatives of target demands, 
but instead in accordance with the needs of ‘real people: 
 
Well we’re a bit different to somebody with a [minor medical 
problem]. You know, and every [patient of ours] is very 
different…  So I’ve had arguments with the guy over there [in 
HR] … [who] said, ‘So, looking at your diary on Lorenzo, you 
see one [patient] for half an hour but your next [patient] you see 
for an hour?’  Well yes, the half an hour is a review of a 
[patient] that I gave a home programme to, so I’m just checking 
him.  Actually a new one is a lot more complex and needs an 
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hour.  And [HR say] how come with some [patients], you can 
see them in a group?  So why don’t you see all [patients] in 
groups because that way you can see six in an hour?  But [we 
say] not every [patient] fits in a group. So you’re working with 
mathematicians [in HR] and we’re working with real people 
here. (Middle Manager/AHP, Primary Care Trust) 
 
Another PCT manager described the widespread setting of ‘sometimes very bizarre 
targets for us that we’re expected [to meet]’. This is a situation where financial goals 
rather than patient outcomes were (as above) clearly dominant.  Yet another 
interviewee reported that senior management was pressuring care staff to reduce the 
amount of time and resource spent on each patient: 
 
One of the questions was, ‘how many times do you need to see 
a [patient] before you cure them’? You know, I saw a [patient] 
last week who I cured there and then on the spot.  Finished.  
[But] another [patient] you think, I’ll have him until he’s sixteen … 
But that’s what the management don’t realise …  And that is 
what is so frustrating in our role that we want to deliver a service 
but actually we’re having this made more and more difficult.  
(Middle Manager/AHP, Primary Care Trust) 
 
The PCT case clearly highlights a potential contradiction between the demands of 
business efficiency and integrity of care. This situation is contradictory in that the 
squeeze on resources was pitching healthcare providers into an ongoing battle with 
healthcare commissioners, who seem to be prioritizing business efficiency simply by 
reducing the spending per patient, or trying to force medical practitioners to cut back 
on ‘integrity of care’. Middle managers at the point of service delivery tried, where 
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possible, to find a solution that at least partially satisfied the demands of ‘integrity of 
care’, hereby drawing on experience-driven and informal methods of street-level 
bureaucracy to do so. 
 
Elsewhere the extension of private sector provision into the NHS healthcare 
economy was often viewed by Trust managers as a means of diverting patients away 
from busier parts of the healthcare system. Target systems were generated to 
incentivize NHS staff to re-direct some of the ‘easier’ patients to private sector care 
providers.  One of the examples we encountered was the case of ambulance staff 
being encouraged to take patients to private sector ‘Urgent Care Centres’ rather than 
to NHS hospital Accident and Emergency departments.  In this case, however, many 
frontline ambulance staff we consulted were wary of this policy, because it was often 
difficult for road crews to categorically diagnose certain patients at being at ‘lesser 
risk’.  As such, crews tended to default to the ‘safety-first’ option of taking almost 
every patient to the better-staffed and more comprehensive A&E departments. This 
meant ignoring the target about transporting a certain proportion of patients to the 
private sector Urgent Care Centre. It also contributed to the Hospital Trust’s A&E 
workload and often meant long waits for ambulance crews and the increased 
likelihood of the Ambulance Trust missing its response time targets. But the patients’ 
needs had to come first. In our observation field notes (reproduced below) from a 
management training day at the Ambulance Trust, we learn that a private contractor 
is now also running the reception of the A&E department of a major NHS hospital, 
creating further friction with core NHS staff, who keep ‘insisting’ on taking their 
patients to the acute hospital for treatment, when under ‘business-efficient’ thinking 
they should take them to the private-sector Urgent Care Centre instead:  
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A Paramedic Emergency Services manager starts to complain 
about the private company that has won the contract to run the 
administration/front desk/reception for the A&E at a hospital in a 
nearby town.  They also run a medical centre in the area. ‘Up to 
40% of our A&E patients are supposed to go to their Urgent 
Care Centre. This is creating conflict – they are a private 
company running A&E reception. They’re jammed up, the 4 hour 
waits are about to trip, they’re snowed in, and we bring them 
more patients. We’re the fly in the ointment. They want us to 
take them elsewhere.’ (Observation field notes, Training course - 
‘Commissioning’, Ambulance Trust) 
 
In this case, NHS staff were able, up to a point, to exercise their own professional 
judgement using street-level bureaucracy in order to rebuff the official, ‘business-
driven’, line. Paramedic crews felt that by doing so they were putting patients first, at 
least for as long as possible, until rationing and organizational demands close off this 
avenue. Across our case studies, the split between notions of being ‘business-
efficient’ and ‘care-efficient’ was making life extremely difficult for frontline and middle 
management roles. The targets regime was forcing them to try to please two 
masters, and in the process incentivizing them to move in two very different 
directions. A middle manager in the Ambulance Trust explained this in a very simple 
phrase: ‘you can’t do both – something will give’: 
 
We haven’t got the resources to go out and deal with the jobs 
the way that we are doing.  So things need to change for that, 
but we’ve still got the same targets that we had, you know, we’ve 
got targets to make. I think quality and performance need to be 
dealt with separately in the Trust.  Because we’re trying to meet 
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performance, and that’s up here, where actually we’re supposed 
to be a patient care and quality type organization, and the two 
things don’t always … [she tails off] You can’t do both, 
something will give. (Middle Manager/Paramedic, Ambulance 
Trust) 
 
In a situation regularly rehearsed in studies of NHS middle level managers (see 
Hutchinson and Purcell, 2010) greater work intensity was apparent in all four case 
study organizations, mostly as a result insufficient staff resources.  Work intensity 
and resource paucity were both perceived to contribute to long-standing problems 
with morale.  Both were potentially worrying as regards patient safety and care 
quality; precisely the kinds of problems that enveloped Mid Staffordshire. According 
to the national NHS survey, only 30% of staff perceive there is sufficient human 
resource capacity to enable them to do their jobs effectively, with the figure for 
ambulance staff being just 21% (Department of Health, 2013: 4). Such issues were 
highlighted from data derived from our Mental Health Trust case study. Here a ward 
manager provides an instructive case, as she seems to inadvertently admit that the 
fundamental act of spending time with patients - seemingly a core competence of 
NHS organizations - has now been problematized by the targets culture: 
 
I probably still spend quite a bit of time with patients, but that’s 
because my time management’s really poor... at the same time 
there’s the requirements from the Trust perspective and from 
legislation that, you know, we have to be achieving certain 
targets and audits have to be completed and the documentation 
that goes with that and the administration, so you’re, kind of, 
you’re very much split, really. (Middle Manager/Clinician, Mental 
Health Trust)  
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Administrative demands for clinical and managerial accountability to the various 
systems of performance management were also time-consuming in themselves. 
Another mid-level manager/clinical at the Mental Health Trust explained her 
exasperation with these demands, (some of which seemed to arrive without warning), 
which contributed to an alienating work culture of ‘chasing targets’ in which patients 
‘are a number’: 
 
I can’t even remember who wanted it, and it was called ‘Patterns of Care’ and 
it was about people having a review recorded on [an electronic records 
system]  [laughs]... nobody had told us we needed to record this on [that 
particular system].  So for the whole year we had to go back and find the 
review date, what [staff certification level] they were on; who attended the 
review, dah-dah-dah-dah-dah.  And it took all weekend. We were just in here 
all weekend doing it off pieces of paper we had archived and it was just a 
nightmare; absolute nightmare.  We sent it in and that was that, and there 
was no even, “Oh thanks for all your hard work,” or anything.  We just sent it 
in and that was that.  And what difference that made I don’t know. I am sure it 
got us out of a bit of hot water with some registration authority, but it didn’t 
make any difference to the care that the patients got on the ward.  It didn’t 
change the care that the patient gets on the ward […]  You have to deliver on 
a target every month because that’s the way the service is funded, but it’s not 
about the quality of care somebody is getting; it’s about meeting a number 
[…] number of contacts; number of episodes, number of referrals […] and it’s 
not meaningful and you are just chasing, chasing targets and what you are 
doing is then not meaningful because you are seeing somebody because 
they are a number.  (Acute Services Manager, Mental Health Trust) 
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Heavy workloads were exacerbated by the penetration of the targets culture into HR 
management. Just as targets often served to reduce clinicians’ scope for discretion in 
patient care episodes, HR targets limited the levels of discretion that middle 
managers could use in managing healthcare staff. In the Ambulance Trust middle 
managers were targeted to have the weekly roster fully-staffed 98% of the time. They 
were barred from having any more than 15% of their ‘resource’ on leave at any point 
in time, and were working to 5% or less as a sickness ‘target’. (Ambulance staff are 
often prone to lifting injuries, for example.)  But even in this often very tough working 
environment - one that scores well below the NHS norm on almost all work 
satisfaction indices (Department of Health, 2013) - the dedication of the majority of 
the workforce was readily apparent. Ambulance staff did not want to be absent and 
took pride in their roles:  
 
[Being a paramedic] It’s a hard job. There’s no doubt, it’s a hard 
job. But I wouldn’t want to do anything else. If I got injured and 
couldn’t do this job anymore I’d be destroyed. My life would be 
destroyed. (Team Leader/Paramedic, Ambulance Services 
Trust) 
 
Such dedication and professionalism was visible across the healthcare professionals 
and middle managers we interviewed and observed in the case studies. However, 
confronted by the harsh reality of an abstract and often ‘bizarre’ targets culture, their 
morale was often low and they expressed critical views about the effectiveness of 
their Trusts as both employers and care providers. These organizations need to build 
on the dedication of their staff and not allow goodwill to evaporate (Bartram et al, 
2007; Khatri et al, 2006; Leggat et al, 2010). But with HR hamstrung by targets, the 
everyday operational needs of the organization naturally took precedence over staff 
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development, which either fell away completely, or else became an empty and 
ritualized form of target-driven ‘box ticking’, such as the much-maligned KSF 
programme. 
 
After all, the ostensive aim of socialized healthcare organizations is not profit 
(business efficiency), but rather care for human beings (integrity of care). The NHS 
staff we interviewed were keenly aware of financial imperatives and very sensitive to 
this part of the modern healthcare ‘quandary’.  Indeed employees often stressed the 
need to ‘do everything you can to win the contract’, and to constantly ‘demonstrate 
their cost-effectiveness’, or to ‘look at every penny’ in the face of cost-reduction and 
the expansion of private contractors, who can increasingly outbid NHS organizations 
to win ‘care packages’ (see Pollock, 2005). With the state-run provision of healthcare 
facing a major funding crisis (Davis and Tallis, 2013), many NHS junior and mid-level 
employees believe that resources will become ever more tightly rationed. One can 
therefore expect the ‘dilemmas’ of public service to become increasingly severe. 
  
The importation of management by targets from the corporate sector would seem to 
suggest a greater emphasis both on control and business efficiency. Yet the actual 
effectiveness of organizational control falls below what the targets and systems 
procedures promise. If there are too few resources to ‘do both’ then ‘something will 
give’, and in the case of most healthcare professionals what will give will be the 
financial and business efficiency goals.  Wherever possible, NHS staff will utilize the 
professional or para-professional norms of street-level bureaucracy in order to 
provide optimal healthcare provision (Lipsky, 1980). This, however, can cause friction 
across NHS Trusts, and serve to raise the question of whether targets are not only 
unpopular with frontline and middle management staff, but also inefficient and 
ineffective, even for senior management.  We are minded of Lynch’s (2004) 
characterisation of such systems as part of an attempted top-down strengthening of 
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abstract control, a form of control that is sadly inimical to care for patients and to the 
meaningful career development and well-being of healthcare staff.  
 
Conclusion: The tangled web of targets 
 
A prominent argument amid the clamour of responses to the Mid Staffordshire 
scandal is the advocacy of ‘outcome measures’14 as a replacement for ‘performance 
targets’; an argument, indeed, that some have been making for over fifteen years 
(see Taylor, 2013: 213-5). At face value, ‘outcome measures’ appear superficially 
more attractive than performance targets, as the former are more clinically focused 
and patient focused, whereas the latter are all-too-commonly a much narrower, 
managerial tool which aims to control certain forms of employee behaviour. In 
keeping with the concept of the street-level bureaucracy, however, our data suggest 
that in many cases expected clinical outcomes are in practice prioritized by mid-level 
as well as junior staff wherever possible. This also implies that the practices and 
logics of street-level bureaucracy extend upwards into the activities of more senior 
management levels. It can be helpful, therefore, to regard NHS managers as 
involved in managerial work, and thus to conceptualize them as both ‘managers’ and 
part of ‘the managed’ (Hassard et al 2009: 45; see also Osterman, 2008).  
 
This is not to say that business efficiency and the ethic of care are always 
irreconcilable. But given the enormous complexity inherent in the wider healthcare 
economy a melange of targets exists across organizations, a situation characterized 
by sets of mutually incompatible demands. For example, ambulance managers were 
often told by managers of A&E departments that their departments were full, 
meaning long turnaround times for ambulance crews who have to wait for beds to 
become available. This means that ambulance crews are ‘tied up’ at hospital and 
unable to ‘go back active’ and respond to emergency calls, possibly contributing to 
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Ambulance Trusts missing their own 8-minute target response times. Furthermore, 
the pressure on ambulance crews to hit their targets can potentially mean more 
patients are taken to A&E departments than is necessary. This is because the short-
term demands of the targets culture deprive Ambulance Trusts of the time and 
resources to train their staff to a degree where paramedics are willing and able to 
treat patients at home or at emergency scenes.  
 
Our interviews and observations have shown that, in reality, targets are selectively 
prioritized by Trusts across a healthcare economy, for each Trust is measured by 
different, sometimes contradictory, objectives.  Our data also suggest that reconciling 
an ethic of care with one of business efficiency can be extremely problematic. In 
terms of everyday practice, NHS staff, at a number of levels, act as street-level 
bureaucrats in seeking the best clinical outcomes for patients.  This can involve 
contravening, ignoring, working around, gaming, or otherwise fudging the narrower, 
technical needs of business efficiency (Hyde el al, 2009). The 2012 NHS survey 
demonstrated that 62% of staff believed that patients and allied service users were 
their organization’s number one priority (Department of Health, 2013: 2). As we have 
seen above, when NHS healthcare workforces ‘can’t do both’, what will ‘have to give’ 
- at least from the perspective of medical professionals - will be the managerial 
targets, or at least certain elements of them.  
 
Whether workforces and work tasks are monitored by ‘outcome’ or by ‘performance’ 
measures, it seems that neither will resolve this tension inherent in healthcare work. 
Local-level discretion at the site of service delivery, or street-level bureaucracy, can 
never be fully ‘managed out’ by such ‘rational’ administrative logic (Hupe and Hill, 
2007; Lipsky, 1980; Prottas, 1979; Weatherley, 1979). In the words of Maynard-
Moody and Musheno (2003: 3-8) street-level public servants ‘deal with faces’. They 
will tend to find a way to deal with these ‘faces’ wherever possible and to limit the 
34 
 
degree of organizational interference over the ways in which they are dealt with, 
whether at ward level in an Acute or Mental Health Hospital or literally at ‘street-level’ 
when paramedic crews arrive at emergency scenes. Healthcare staff will typically 
want to put patients’ needs above those of business efficiency whenever possible - 
the traditional ‘money is no object’ model of healthcare (Taylor, 2013: 55). Clinicians, 
as professionals, often want little to do with the financial matters of healthcare 
organization. Yet the advent of managed care (Scott et al, 2000; Light, 2001; Scheid, 
2004: 63-4) and related developments in the NHS (Davis and Tallis, 2013; Fairfield et 
al 1997; Pollock, 2005; Taylor 2013: 83) has introduced all manner of administrative 
systems that aim to limit and control the scope and expense of patient treatments. 
Targets and metrics also promote the sort of quantification that makes services more 
readily transferable across providers. Coupled with today’s increasingly challenging 
environment of public sector ‘austerity’, the much-maligned performance metrics 
reveal ever more clearly that resources are not only finite, but increasingly tightly 
rationed.  
 
In terms of employee relations, our research into junior and middle management 
across four NHS organizations highlights what often appears to be a potentially 
dysfunctional work culture - one suggestive of worrying similarities with the infamous 
failures at Mid Staffordshire. Professional discretion, as reflected in both the 
treatment of patients and the operation of HR, has been increasingly sundered by a 
narrow focus on ‘making the numbers’. While there is a significant literature critical of 
those forms of professional power that have traditionally dominated healthcare 
organizations (see Freidson, 2001), we argue that a return to professional authority 
may be preferable to the current scenario. If similarly professional forms of HRM 
could be developed, this would also be a welcome step towards an ethic of care for 
workers and employee advocacy that may boost morale and operational 
effectiveness (Hyde et al, 2009; Stanton et al, 2010; Townsend et al, 2011; West et 
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al, 2006). In other words, if such developments could be realised then healthcare 
organizations would be able to go about their real business of providing care and 
attention to patients and allied service users.  
 
As long ago as 1972, Ida Hoos, in a critique of the application of systems analysis 
into public services, forcefully argued that the adoption of such supposedly ‘rational’ 
and ‘objective’ means of measurement and control would lead to widespread 
dysfunction. She argued specifically that: 
 
‘Contrary to the presuppositions of “systematic” planners, public health is not 
virgin territory. Like education, it is an area of longtime concern to persons 
with professional competence and experience. The excuse that programs do 
not function as well as intended or that “delivery systems” are not as effective 
or efficient as might be hoped is not sufficient reason to bring in “technical 
experts” who mistake ignorance for objectivity and whose objectivity is 
suspect.’ (Hoos, 1972: 192) 
 
Our data suggest that these controversies remain highly relevant today. In the 
complex world of healthcare - in which both the ‘cost’ and ‘effectiveness’ of care 
episodes are notoriously difficult to measure - management by targets is deeply 
problematic, as dysfunctional performance measures become the reality, even while 
so often distorting it. Moreover, street-level bureaucracy, informal discretion and 
professional norms cannot be fully eradicated, despite the efforts of the system 
designers; for they so often re-emerge, as public servants try to handle the 
contradictions and dilemmas that ‘rational’ control measures help to create (Evans 
and Harris 2004). Targets are a constant bugbear for both healthcare professionals 
and middle managers and in the wider sphere a major source of tension between 
NHS Trusts.  
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Moreover, the dysfunctional dependence on inflexible metrics has now ‘crept’ from 
the management of patients into the realm of healthcare HRM, undermining the 
prospects for the development of progressive or professional ‘SHRM’ (Strategic 
Human Resource Management). We advocate a return to more traditional concepts 
of healthcare management, putting the emphasis back on professional norms and 
professional discretion for both healthcare work and the management of healthcare 
workforces. Professional control, while problematic in its own way, is infinitely 
preferable - in moral and practical terms - to the widely discredited numbers-based 
systems for handling workforces and tasks which are complex and human-centred.  
In short, such tasks are better evaluated in terms of care, professionalism and 
compassion than throughput, metrics and ‘efficiency’. As our analysis of healthcare 
settings shows, professional norms (even informal ones) can remain active - and to a 
large extent organizationally and culturally legitimate - even when systems and 
targets try to constrict and control them. 
 
Reforms that return us to a professional dominance model (Freidson, 2001) and the 
building of ‘better bureaucracies’ (Adler, 1999) - rather than ‘targets and terror’ 
(Bevan and Hood, 2006) - are perhaps the only really ‘rational’ means to manage the 
complex and often unpredictable needs of patients and healthcare workforces. This 
situation will never be perfect, and increasingly expensive healthcare resources will 
have to be ‘rationed’, just as they always have been. But if the NHS lessens its 
emphasis on performance targets as the main structuring dynamic of organizational 
control, and takes steps towards re-legitimizing appropriate forms of professional 
discretion, then at least the rationing may be justified on more genuinely clinical 
grounds.  In such a situation, the deep tensions and struggles experienced by ‘street-
level bureaucrats’ in the NHS might be at least partially alleviated. 
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Endnotes 
                                                        
1 The NHS is one of the world’s largest ‘free at the point of use’ health services. It is a state-run 
system employing over 1.3 million staff, and funded primarily by central taxation and 
government borrowing, with care mostly provided free of charge. Health services are primarily 
provided by state-owned, non-profit ‘Trusts’ (such as Acute Hospital Trusts, Ambulance Trusts, 
Mental Health Trusts). The entire system, however, is undergoing substantial reform. Primary 
Care Trusts are being dissolved and services are increasingly provided by private-sector 
contractors, with cost-control becoming a paramount issue for Trust senior management (for an 
overview, see Taylor, 2013). 
 
2 See, for example ‘NHS targets 'may have led to 1,200 deaths' in Mid Staffordshire’, Daily 
Telegraph 17 Mar 2009 
 
3 The accuracy of the macro excess death figures and the micro examples of care failures is a 
matter of some dispute, with certain sections of the press questioning the extent and nature of 
the failings at Stafford Hospital. For example, although lack of access to water, food, and dignity 
were indeed findings of central importance to the Francis Report, there is no mention of the very 
widely-reported ‘patients forced to drink from flower vases’ incident in any of the three volumes 
of the final report (Francis 2013). Suggestions have been made, therefore, that much of the media 
coverage was sensationalized, perhaps as part of a wider attack on the publicly-funded NHS amid 
government austerity measures, see for example ‘Stafford’s A&E set for closure as anger grows at 
‘crucifixion of a good hospital’’, The Guardian 28 July 2013 
 
4 Similar administrative models have also been applied to help reduce costs, rein in professional 
discretion, and standardize practice in social care settings, see for example, Ellis et al (1999). 
 
5 ‘Top A&E doctors warn: ‘We cannot guarantee safe care for patients anymore’, Independent, 20 
May 2013 
 
6 In May 2013 the Royal College of Nursing, the public sector trade union Unison, and the Patients 
Association formed a ‘Safe Staffing Alliance’ to draw attention to inadequate staffing levels across 
hospital wards in England. ‘Nurse staffing levels unsafe, says Safe Staffing Alliance’, BBC News, 12 
May 2013 
 
7 ‘East of England Ambulance Service ‘fails on response times’, BBC News, 25 February 2013 
 
8 ‘Paramedic: Ambulance delays ‘causing harm and deaths’, BBC News, 4 May 2013 
 
9 ‘A&E units on cliff edge, say NHS leaders’, BBC News, 21 May 2013 
 
10 Another scandal involving allegations of falsification of targets data, poor patient care 
outcomes, and bullying of staff broke at Colchester General Hospital in November 2013. 
‘Colchester hospital hit by fresh fears over falsified cancer records’, The Observer, 9 November 
2013 
 
11 The NHS Constitution contains the following four ‘Pledges’ as regards NHS organizations’ 
duties as employers: 
Pledge 1: To provide all staff with clear roles and responsibilities and rewarding jobs for teams 
and individuals that make a difference to patients, their families and carers, and to communities.  
Pledge 2: To provide all staff with personal development plans, access to appropriate training 
for their jobs and the support of line management to succeed.  
Pledge 3: To provide support and opportunities for staff to maintain their health, well-being and 
safety  
Pledge 4: To engage staff in decisions that affect them and the services they provide, 
individually, through representative organizations and through local partnership working 
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arrangements. All staff will be empowered to put forward ways to deliver better and safer 
services for patients and their families.  
(Department of Health, 2013: 1) 
 
12 It is perhaps likely that Ambulance Trusts’ comparatively low scores in the national staff 
survey are related to a long history of industrial relations strife in this sector, a low-Trust 
working climate, and a ‘blame culture’ (AUTHORS 2013; Wankhade 2012). 
 
13 KSF stands for Knowledge and Skills Framework, an HR development / performance 
management system linked to the NHS’s Agenda for Change pay grades and job evaluation 
criteria. 
 
14 Outcome measures have been defined as “a measure of change, the difference from one point in 
time (usually before an intervention) to another point in time (usually following an 
intervention).” (Kendall, 1997: 11).  
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